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CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER THE JURISDICTION
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS*
PAUL M.
I.

CONGRESS'

BATORt

POWER OVER THE JURISDICTION OF THE

INFERIOR FEDERAL COURTS

The Constitution contains many provisions that are not at all
clear. It does, however, contain a few that are clear. One of the
clearest is the power of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction of
federal "[t]ribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."
Article III of the Constitution provides that the "judicial
Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."' As we know from the records of the
Constitutional Convention, this text was the product of a compromise between those who thought that the Constitution itself
should establish a full set of federal courts, and those who thought
that the Constitution should authorize no federal courts inferior
to the Supreme Court whatever. The purpose of the compromise
was to leave it to legislative judgment, to be made from time to
time, whether and to what extent lower federal courts are needed
to assure the effectiveness and supremacy of federal law. 2
The Constitutional text itself makes clear that Congress is free
to decide that there should be no lower federal courts at all. This
would leave all questions of federal law (including the enforcement
of federal rights) wholly to the state courts in the first instance,
subject to review in the United States Supreme Court. However,
the purpose of the compromise imbedded in Article III goes further than giving the Congress the all-or-nothing power to decide
whether lower federal courts should exist. It leaves it to Congress
* This paper is based substantially on a statement by the author before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
in May, 1981. See Hearings on Constitutional Restraints on the Judiciary
Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-56 (1981).
t Bromley Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

11-13 (2d ed.

1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].

(1030)
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to decide, having created lower federal courts, what their jurisdiction should be-that is, to decide which of the cases to which
the federal judicial power extends should be litigated in the lower
federal courts.
The position that Congress has this additional power to "pick
and choose," to create lower federal courts and give them less than
the entire federal judicial power, is not based primarily on the
mechanical argument that the greater power (not to create such
courts at all) must include the lesser (to create them but limit their
jurisdiction). It is based on the fact that this reading is the only
one consistent with the understanding which animated the compromise adopted by the Framers. The essence of that compromise
was an agreement that the question whether access to the lower
federal courts was necessary to assure the effectiveness of federal
law should not be answered as a matter of constitutional principle,
but rather, should be left a matter of political and legislative judgment, to be made from time to time in the light of particular
circumstances. It would make nonsense of that notion to hold
that the only power to be exercised is the all-or-nothing power to
decide whether none or all of the cases to which the federal judicial
power extends need the haven of a lower federal court. The central
premise of the compromise was the insight that the question
whether a given "federal" case should initiate in a state court
(subject to Supreme Court review), or in a lower federal court, is
not an appropriate question for a decision at the constitutional
level. Rather, Congress is the body best suited to make this institutional judgment on the basis of changing circumstances.
The position that the Constitution obligates Congress to create
lower federal courts, or (having created them) to vest them with
some or all of the jurisdiction authorized by article III, has been
repudiated by an unbroken line of authoritative judicial and
legislative precedent. From the very first, Congress has acted on
the premise that it is for it to decide which if any of the cases
and controversies to which the federal judicial power extends
should be litigated in the first instance in lower federal courts.
The First Judiciary Act, passed by a Congress whose membership
included many of the Framers, created lower federal courts but
gave them only a small portion of the federal judicial power.3
Cases arising under federal law could not generally be brought in
3. The First Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 84 (1789).

the state courts cases arising under federal law. See
note 2, at 32-36.
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the lower federal courts until 1875; 4 and even thereafter, a jurisdictional amount limit put many such cases in the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the state courts. 5 Further-and most significantlyto this day litigants who assert federal rights by way of defense
do not generally have any access to the inferior federal courts.
Nor has this exercise of Congressional power been a one-way
ratchet. Congress has consistently felt free to restrict lower court
jurisdiction even after it has been given. Thus, it has on numerous
occasions raised the jurisdictional amount. 6 It has both expanded
and restricted the diversity and removal jurisdictions.7 It has
excluded from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts special
categories of cases-most significantly in measures such as the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,8 the Johnson Act of 1934,9 and the Tax
Injunction Act of 1937.10
Further, and notwithstanding contrary dicta by Justice Story
in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee," the Supreme Court has upheld

Congress' exercise of this power in an unbroken line of authoritative precedent. 12 Indeed, the dramatic fact is that not a single
Supreme Court case can be cited casting the slightest doubt on the
validity of the hundreds of statutes premised on the notion that
it is for Congress to decide which, if any, of the cases to which
the federal judicial power extends should be litigated in the first
instance in the lower federal courts.
The most recent authoritative statement of the meaning of
the Constitution in this respect is the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Palmore v. United States.'3

Here is the relevant passage:

4. General federal question jurisdiction was first granted to the inferior
federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
5. The jurisdictional amount limit for federal question cases was set
initially at $500. Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). It was escalated
in stages to $10,000. It was not eliminated until 1980. See Act of December
11, 1980, Pub. L. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980) (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1331).
6. See, e.g., Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (raising the jurisdictional amount to $10,000).
7. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 1050-51, 1192-93.

8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
11. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 2, at 313-15.
12. See cases cited in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 309-24. In particular, see the important opinion in Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
13. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
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Article III describes the judicial power as extending
to all cases, among others, arising under the laws of the
United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is
vested "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." The decision with
respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the task of
defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of
Congress. That body was not constitutionally required
to create inferior Art. III courts to hear and decide cases
within the judicial power of the United States, including
those criminal cases arising under the laws of the United
States. Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was
it required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was
authorized to bestow under Art. III. "[T]he judicial
power of the United States . . . is (except in enumerated
instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent
for its distribution and organization, and for the modes
of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who
possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior
to the Supreme Court) . . . and of investing them with
jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and
of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees
and character which to Congress may seem proper for the
public good."
Congress plainly understood this, for until 1875
Congress refrained from providing the lower federal
courts with general federal-question jurisdiction. Until
that time, the state courts provided the only forum for
vindicating many important federal claims. Even then,
with exceptions, the state courts remained the sole forum
for the trial of federal cases not involving the required
jurisdictional amount, and for the most part retained concurrent jurisdiction of federal claims properly within the
14
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
In light of this clear-and consistent-line of authority in the
Supreme Court, occasional lower-court dicta which espouse the
opposite view do not have authoritative weight.
It should be noted that it is not my argument that Congress
has plenary power to determine what if any rights shall be enforceable in court. The Constitution does guarantee that, under
certain circumstances, there shall be access to courts; due process
14. Id. at 400-01 (citations omitted).
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does in some cases mean judicial process. 15 Consequently, Congress is not free to control the jurisdiction of the state courts so
as to foreclose the vindication of the constitutional right to judicial
review. But the Constitution is indifferent whether that access is
to a federal or a state court. If the Congress decides that a
certain category of case arising under federal law should be litigated in a state court, subject to Supreme Court review, neither
the letter nor the spirit of the Constitution has been violated.
What has happened is that Congress has taken up one of the
precise options which the Constitutional Framers specifically
envisaged. From the viewpoint of the Constitution, nothing has
gone awry.
It is commonplace to say that Congress' power to regulate
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts cannot be exercised
in a manner that violates some other Constitutional rule. In that
sense-and in that sense only-it can be said that Congress' power
is not plenary. Thus, if Congress provides that only Catholics
may bring suits in the lower federal courts, this would be invalid,
not because non-Catholics have a constitutional right of access to
lower federal courts, but because the Constitution prohibits any
Congressional action discriminating among religious denominations. Similarly, a statute which said that whites only may resort
to the district courts would be invalid. The reason, again, is
that, in the absence of some compelling and valid justification,
Congress is not free to make distinctions based on race.
Furthermore, a Congressional statute regulating the lower
courts' jurisdiction in a wholly arbitrary manner ("only plaintiffs
who are more than six feet tall may sue in the district courts")
would obviously violate the due process clause.
It is, however, a fundamental and egregious mistake to
broaden this argument into an assertion that Congress is not free
to differentiate among different subject matters, and to specify
categories of cases arising under federal law which may or may
not be brought in the lower federal courts. Unlike legislation
which makes distinctions on the basis of race or religion, there is
no independent constitutional rule which says, absolutely or presumptively, that various categories of federal question litigation
must be treated jurisdictionally alike. There is no independent
constitutional value which says that it is absolutely or presumptively illegitimate, or undesirable, or suspect to decide that one
15. See generally

HART & WECHSLER,

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE

supra note 2, at 324-60; L.

JAFFE,

ACTION 376-94 (1965).
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category of federal right shall be enforced originally and exclusively in the state courts, whereas another may be litigated in the
lower federal courts. From the perspective of the Constitution,
the obligation to litigate a given category of federal question cases
in the state courts is not a "burdening" of that right. Indeed, it
was the very purpose of the article III compromise to give Congress the power to make precisely these decisions.
It is therefore my submission that a statute providing that
cases challenging the validity of state legislative apportionments,
or cases challenging the validity of state statutes regulating abortions, may not be brought in the lower federal courts, would
(if correctly drafted technically) be invulnerable to constitutional
challenge. (It is important to note that there are difficult technical problems in drafting such statutes. Congress is free to
decide that a lower federal court may not hear a given category
of case or controversy at all. But it cannot allow a federal court
to take jurisdiction and then command it to decide the case in an
unconstitutional manner. Intricate problems of draftsmanship,
therefore, arise when statutes seek to remove federal court jurisdiction over certain types of questions.) Such a statute would, if
correctly drafted, be valid because it would exemplify the very
power that the Framers sought to give Congress: the power to
decide that federal interests are best maintained by requiring
certain cases to which the federal judicial power extends to be
initiated in the state-rather than the lower federal-courts.
Various arguments contrary to this position have been offered,
but none of them seem to me to be impressive.
The argument advanced by Justice Story, that article III
requires the Congress to vest the entire quantum of federal judicial
power in federal courts, has been rejected by an unbroken line
of Congressional and Supreme Court precedents, running from
the time of the first Congress to the present. It no longer deserves
to be taken seriously.
It is sometimes argued that, notwithstanding the clearly expressed plan of the Framers, changing circumstances show that
lower federal courts are an absolute necessity and that we should
therefore override the original understanding and restrict Congress' power. 10 The argument seems to me to be wholly illegiti16. See Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 501 (1974); cf. Redish ScWoods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical
Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 52-54 (1975).
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mate and without authority. Indeed, the argument refutes itself:
the fact that circumstances are, today, different than they were in
1789 with respect to the need for and role of lower federal courts,
supports the wisdom of the Framers' compromise rather than
furnishing an excuse for its abandonment.
It is sometimes asserted that Congress does not have the
authority to carve out special categories of cases arising under
federal law and remit those to the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the state courts. 17 It is unclear just why this is asserted to be
so. Neither the equal protection clause nor any other clause of
the Constitution requires equal jurisdictional treatment for different subject-matters of litigation. If it is asserted that this "discriminates" against a certain category of federal right, the answer
must be that such discriminations-that is, the power to pick and
choose among different categories and subject matters of federal
cases-is precisely the power that article III sought to grant.
Ultimately the assertion must rest on the notion that there is a
constitutional right as such to litigate certain categories of cases
in the lower federal courts-a notion which seems to me to be
plainly erroneous.
A somewhat narrower argument is that if it is shown that
Congress' motive in requiring a certain category of case to be
brought in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the state courts
is "hostility" to the substantive constitutional right in question,
it can be struck down. I do not understand how such a rule
could be administered. What would be an adequate indication
of hostility? The New Deal Congress, in 1934 and again in 1937,
moved by serious reservations about the constitutional doctrines
restricting the states' regulatory and taxing authority under the
due process clause, provided that constitutional suits to restrain
the enforcement of state tax statutes' and public utility rate
orders' 9 must ordinarily be brought in the state courts. Are
these statutes invalid? No court or commentator has so suggested
in the past forty years. Why is a statute, divesting the lower
federal courts of jurisdiction to hear suits challenging state statutes
regulating abortions different?
17. See, e.g., Sager, Foreward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 17 (1981).
18. See note 10 supra.
19. See note 9 supra.
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Indeed, the notion that it is illegitimate for Congress to express concerns about substantive constitutional matters through
the technique of jurisdictional regulation is itself erroneous. As
just stated, that is precisely what Congress did in the Johnson Act
of 1934 and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, and it acted in an
20
analogous manner in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

Such juris-

dictional statutes rest on a rational and legitimate notion: that
our federalism may benefit if the further elaboration of certain
types of constitutional issues are subjected to the insights of the
state, rather than the lower federal courts before they reach the
United States Supreme Court. 21 The state courts, equally with
the federal, are charged with the task of enforcing and protecting
federal constitutional rights. To give them the task of doing sosubject to Supreme Court review-may manifest concern with or
even disagreement with existing constitutional doctrine, but does
not subvert it. Such a decision by the Congress may quite legitimately rest on two allied notions: that in interpreting the constitutional provisions which restrict state power, it may be wise in
the first instance to have access to the insights of the tribunals
which are closest to the problem at hand; and, second, that it may
be politically healthy to give the state courts the opportunity in
the first instance to enforce federal constitutional restrictions on
state power.
I conclude that a correctly drafted statute that does nothing
more than provide that a given category of case or controversy
arising under the Federal Constitution or laws shall revert to the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the state courts is valid, so long as
it does not create discriminations which the Constitution inde22
pendently prohibits and is not wholly irrational and arbitrary.
It must be stressed that the fact that Congress has the power to
do something is not an argument that it should exercise that power.
Nothing in this paper should be taken to be an endorsement of any
particular proposal with regard to the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts. Indeed, Congress should be most cautious in creating special jurisdictional rules for special categories of constitutional
litigation. Such statutes are dangerous because they seem to be
premised on the very argument which animates those who assert
20. See note 8 supra.
21. See generally Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 629-34 (1981).

22. I am assuming the case is not one within the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction.
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that Congress lacks this power-the argument that state courts may

be expected to give federal constitutional rights less vigorous enforcement than the lower federal courts.
On the other hand, this kind of jurisdictional regulation is
quite legitimate if it is the conscientious judgment of Congress that
a given category of federal constitutional litigation may benefit from
the special insights state courts can provide into matters that touch
closely upon the regulatory and political authority of the states.
And I stress again my initial point. The Constitution has relatively
few things in it which are clear; the power to allocate cases arising
under federal law between the lower federal and the state courts
must be counted as one of them. There are many legitimate reasons
for not favoring legislation that restricts the power of the lower
federal courts to adjudicate abortion cases, or apportionment cases,
or some other category of cases. However, doubts about Congress'
power to enact these statutes is not one of them.
II.

CONGRESS' POWER

OVER THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION

OF THE SUPREME COURT

Congress' power to control the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court raises questions that are much more difficult. The
difficulty is created by the following circumstance. The text of the
Constitution provides that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court shall be subject to "such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the CongTess shall make." 23 This language plainly seems
to indicate that if Congress wishes to exclude a certain category of
federal constitutional (or other) litigation from the appellate jurisdiction, it has the authority to do so. If the Constitution means
what it says, it means that Congress can make the state courts-or,
indeed, the lower federal courts-the ultimate authority for the
decision of any category of case to which the federal judicial power
extends.
What is so troubling about that position, however, is that such
a jurisdictional withdrawal would create a system inconsistent with
the structure that the Framers assumed to be appropriate. The
"states' rights" argument at the Constitutional Convention was that
there was no need for lower federal courts precisely because the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would provide sufficient
assurance of the supremacy and uniformity of federal law in cases
decided by the state courts. It was the premise of this argument
23. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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that the Supreme Court would have the power to review cases
originating in the state courts concerning issues of federal law. It
was plainly not contemplated that the system could work effectively
with the state courts as courts of last resort on issues of federal law.
Even on the assumption that the state courts would comply with
the supremacy clause and conscientiously enforce the Federal Constitution and laws, the insuperable problem would be that there
would be no way to make the commands of federal law uniform as
well as supreme.
I stated before that a statute providing that an important
category of constitutional litigation is to be within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the state courts would not violate the letter
or the spirit of the Constitution. A statute depriving the Supreme
Court of appellate jurisdiction over the same category of constitutional litigation would, however, violate the spirit of the Constitution, even if it would not violate its letter. It violates the spirit
because the structure contemplated by the instrument makes senseand was thought to make sense-only on the premise that there
would be a federal Supreme Court with the power to pronounce
uniform and authoritative rules of federal law.
Does it make sense to say that there may be things that do not
formally violate the Constitution-that comply with its letter, and
therefore are not "invalid"-that nevertheless violate its spirit? The
answer is clearly "yes." Congress has undoubted power to pack the
Supreme Court by making it a court of fifteen, twenty, or even fifty
Justices. A statute so doing could not be held invalid. But there
is no doubt that such a statute would violate the Constitution's
spirit-that it would run against the purpose of the Framers to
create an independent judiciary.
We should therefore not be embarrassed to take the position
that Congress may have the authority to carve out subject matters
and withdraw them from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
but should not do so, not only because they represent bad policy
but because they violate the structure and spirit of the instrument.
Should one go further and adopt the position that Congress
does not have the power to carve out areas of federal-question or
constitutional litigation from the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court?
Various arguments have been advanced which would limit the
powers of Congress to create exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in a variety of ways. Some of the arguments
are historical-they assert that the power to make exceptions was in-
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tended by the Framers to be restricted to questions of fact. 24

Other

arguments depend on the assertion that to allow Congress such a
power would subvert the fundamental Constitutional plan.25
There are major weaknesses and flaws in all of these arguments.
The historical evidence is far from conclusive, but the evidence to
support the proposition that the exceptions clause was to be reserved
exclusively to issues of fact is weak. Arguments deriving from
"structural" notions are also weak, primarily because they are so
vague, particularly in the face of a text that is not at all vague.
True, there is ample evidence that the Framers generally contemplated Supreme Court review of state court judgments. But they
also contemplated Congressional regulation of this jurisdiction, and
nothing in the "structure of the document" argument serves in any
powerful way to distinguish between regulations that are valid and
those that are invalid.
In this connection, it must be remembered that Congress has
in fact made major exceptions in the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. For a century, federal criminal cases were not
generally reviewable in the Supreme Court; 21 if the critical feature
of the "structural argument" is the need for uniformity, this gap
would plainly be invalid. Indeed, for some 100 years, state court
decisions on issues of federal law were themselves reviewable only
on a limited basis, depending on how the state court decided the
federal question.27 Congress also, on one occasion, made an exception to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on an ad
hoc "retaliatory" basis; and this statute was upheld in the celebrated
McCardle case.28 It is fashionable today to stress that McCardle is
special and distinguishable; nevertheless, the language of the Court
in McCardle plainly proceeded on the assumption that Congress'
power is plenary; and this is the only Supreme Court opinion
squarely on point.
My own opinion is that the arguments that would place serious
limits on the power of Congress to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are not, in the end, persuasive.
24. See R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Merry,
Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53
(1962).
25. See Hart, supra note 26, at 1364-65; Ratner, CongressionalPower Over
the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157,
201-02 (1960).
26. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 1539 n.3.
27. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 439-41.
28. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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Indeed, a powerful case can be made that such a plenary power
may be essential to making the institution of judicial review toler29
able in a democratic society.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the contours of the exceptions
clause remain shrouded in considerable doubt. Congress may have
the power to make the state courts the courts of last resort in important categories of constitutional litigation; but its power to do
so is not at all free from ambiguity. Furthermore, even if one
believes-as I do-that Congress has the raw power to do this, the
argument that it would violate the spirit of the instrument to do so
seems extremely powerful. I note, too, the powerful policy arguments against such a retaliatory use of the power granted to Congress by the exceptions clause: it could not long be tolerated to have
the Federal Constitution be subject to different interpretations in
different states on any issue of significance. Nor would it be tolerable to have the law "frozen" permanently into the shape given it
by the last Supreme Court precedents rendered before the enactment of the statute withdrawing jurisdiction-precedents that would
continue to be binding authority in the state courts (and that ironically, are likely to be the very precedents leading to the Congressional dissatisfaction manifested in the new jurisdictional
statute).
I conclude, therefore, that resort to the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court by making the state courts the courts of last resort in one or
more important categories of constitutional litigation is a dubious
expedient. The validity of such a measure would be surrounded
by serious doubts. Such a measure would in any event be criticized
as flying in the face of the spirit of the Constitution; its legitimacy
would therefore be extremely vulnerable, as was the proposal of
President Roosevelt to "pack" the Supreme Court. And, finally,
such a measure would create a host of serious and perhaps intolerable problems in the fair and rational administration of the laws.
29. See Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1001

(1965).
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